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AS GROUNDS FOR RELIEF IN EQUITY.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to treat of the nat-
ure of the accidents and mistakes which will give rise to the
exercise of equity jurisdiction. No attempt has been made to
discuss the remedies incideAt'%to these classes of cases.
Though the aid of equity has been granted for accidents and
mistakes for several centuries, there yet remain many doubts
and unsettled principles. It will be the writer's task to
seek to clear these doubts and reconcile many of the conflict-
ing adjudications; to formulate general tests, whereby it may
be seen what cases come within, and those that are beyond,
the Jurisdiction of equity courts.
To enable the reader the better to understand the
subject as complete and correct a definition as possible of
each branch of the subject will be given, and this will be
followed by an analysis and explanation viewed in the light
of the discussions of this country and of England.
The subject proper, then, will be begun with a
definition of an accident.
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CHAPTER I.
AC O I DE N T
In the sense in which accident is used in equity it
may be defined as an unforeseen and injurious event, occuring
external to the parties affected by it, and not attributable
to their mistake, negligence or misconduct; and whereby either
party, contrary to his own wishes or intention, loses some
legal right, or incurs some legal obligation, and the other
acquires a corresponding legal right, which, if under the
circumstances, it were enforced, would be a violation of good
conscience.
It will be seen that accident relates to facts wholly
external to the parties, and refers to some event which hap-
pened after the transaction took place and which caused a
change in the rights and liabilities of the parties, neither
expressed nor contemplated by the parties at the time of mak-
ing the transaction in question. Formerly it was understood
that these facts were confined to act of Providence. his is
not true today, and strictly speaking never was true. Mr.
Story expresses the idea when he says that accidents extend
to unforeseen events, misfortunes, loses, acts or omissions,
which are not the result of negligence or misconduct of the
parties. He has, however, expressed himself in terms that
are too broad and comprehensive to be correct, for it is ob-
vious that his classifications include many cases of mistake.
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It must not be understood that equity will afford
relief in all cases, upon merely showing to.the court the ac-
cident. It must further appear that the parties have not
been guilty of any negligence, or of any careless or thought-
less dealings, whereby they, or either of them, have involved
themselves in unforeseen legal relations. (Sims v. Lyle, 4
Wash. C. C. 320)
Nor will equity interfere when the parties have a
full and adequate remedy at law; this is based upon one of
the well known maxims of equity; or if power has been bestow-
ed upon the law courts by statute, to take cognizance of the
accident, equity will be excldded. (Hall v. Hall, 45 Ala. 488)
So in cases of contract where the party has uncon-
ditionally agreed to perform his part, he can find no relief
in equity, if by accident the subject matter is destroyed, or
he is himself incapicitated. For instance,- if a party un-
conditionally agrees to build a house, and before the same is
finished it is by accident destroyed; he must suffer the loss
and rebuild. This is due partly to the rigid rule of law
which requires parties to fulfill absolute promises, and part-
ly to the person's neglect in not inserting conditional elatses.
This latter class of cases must not be confused
with forfeitures for the non-performance of a covenant by a
certain fixed day; equity will grant relief when the breach
can be compensated in damages. The reason for this distinct-
ion is clear; in the first case the party seeks to avoid the
obligation imposed by his agreement, as in the common case of
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the lessee seeking to avoid the payment of rent after acci-
dental destruction of the premises. But in the second case
it is not the obligation, but the penalty or forfeiture which
he seeks to avoid, and equity will aid him.
If the party against whom relief is sought is upon
equal equities, and entitled to equal protection with the
other party, equity will not exercise its jurisdiction. In a
case where an imperfect will was sought to be established
against an innocent heir at law, equity refused to take cog-
nizance because the heir was entitled by law to possession,
and enjoyment, of the estate. Another case of frequent oc-
currence is that of a bona fide purchaser for value and with-
out notice; an equity of which he was unaware cannot be set
up against him.
It is more difficult to tell of what cases equity
will take cognizance than to point out the few well defined
instances which come within the jurisdiction of equity. No
general classification of cases can be made which will be
comprehensive enough to include all the instances within the
scope of equity. A discussion of the cases in which aid may
be obtained from equity will now be taken up.
Relief may be had in cases of lost instruments,
sealed or otherwise; when penalties have been incurred; when
powers have been defectively executed.
Under this first head come deeds, bonds, court re-
cords, promissory notes, and wills. But equity will not as-
sume jurisdiction in all cases of this kind. It must be shown
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by affidavit that the instrument was lost and an offer of in-
demnity, if one is necessary, is made, and then only when
there is proof that there is no remedy at law or no remedy
which is adequate or adapted to the best adjustment of the
rights of the parties.
The jurisdiction of equity is most frequently in-
voked in the case of loss of sealed instruments. The juris-
diction was at first based upon two grounds,- first, because
the common law required profert of all sealed instruments to
entitle the plaintiff to maintain his action. This, of course,
was impossible when a loss occurred. Equity never followed
the law procedure in requiring a profert, so the parties nat-
ural resort was to equity. Second, because it was but just
that, for the protection of the defendant the plaintiff should
indemnify him against any future loss or liability by reason
of a subsequent finding of the instrument. A law court could
not properly or effectually demand the indemnity; while it
certainly is within the province of equity to decree a bond
of indemnity. Though it is true that profert is dispensed
with, yet this, in theory, does not affect the jurisdiction
of equity. (Livingston v. Livingston, 4 John. Ch. 294; Force
v. City of Elizabeth, 27 N. J. Eq. 408)
A distinction is made in cases of sealed instru-
ments between bills for discovery and bills for relief. In
the first case equity is only supplemental to law, and no in-
demnity is required upon filing the bill. It cannot, there-
fore, deprive the law courts of their jurisdiction. But if
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the bill prays for relief, or for a discovery and relief,
then the bill seeks to change the forum of law to equity and
the law is deprived of any further control in the matter.
The next instance of lost instruments is that of
promissory notes, bills of exchange and checks. Here again
equity assumes jurisdiction on the ground of indemnity. The
loss must have occurred before maturity and it is immaterial
whether the note is payable to bearer, endorsed in blank, or
not endorsed at all. There is a difference of opinion in
case of non-negotiable notes, many of the jurisdictions hold-
ing that since the note was a mere evidence of debt between
the parties, and an action at law could be maintained without
requiring any indemnity, and in case of assignment of such a
note the assignee takes subject to all the equities maintain-
able against the original assignor, equity had no jurisdiction.
This exception is not supported by a majority of the American
States, nor should it be, for the party has the right to have
delivered to him the original bill, as a receipt of payment;
furthermore the defendant may, by lapse of time or other cas-
ualties, be prevented from establishing his equities, and he
will, in any case, be put to a great inconvenienm to set
forth such equities. (Arckman v. Painter, 11 W. Va. 386;
Allen v. Smith, 29 Ark. 74; Force v. City of Elizabeth, 27 N.
J. Eq. 408; Hardman v. Rattenby, 53 Ga. 36)
In New York, and in all the states which have adopt-
ed the code procedure, jurisdiction is given to the law courts.
Section 1917 of the New York Civil Code provides that oral
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evidence may be introduced to prove the contents of a note or
bill which has been lost, and an undertaking must be given.
In case of court records the rule seems to be uni-
form to the effect that equity cannot supply those lost by
accident. (Clingham v. Hopkie, 78 Ill. 152; Kean v. Jordan,
13 Fla. 327) But Grant v. Lynch (45 Ala. 204) seems to cir-
cumvent this in part by saying that equity may, in a suit be-
tween the same parties, confirm by decree the title and grant
other necessary relief, when the title in question depended
upon a judicial sale and the records ordering the sale have
been lost by accident.
Among the first cases in which equity exercised
jurisdiction were penalties and forfeitures. As early as the
r6ign of Phillip and Mary bills were filed in equity praying
for relief expressly on the ground of accident. But by the
growth of equity it has general jurisdiction in nearly all
cases of this nature, no matter upon what ground the relief
is sought, so that it is no longer of much importance to know
that equity will take cognizance of these cases on account of
accident. Care must be taken, however, to distinguish penal-
ties from liquidated damages; from agreements to reduce a
debt upon the prompt payment of the agreed sum; and from agree-
ments to accelerate payment of an existing debt; for in neith-
of these instances will equity interfere.
While equity willingly aids a party seeking to avoid
a penalty incurred by accident, it will never aid in the en-
forcement of a penalty or forfeiture, by reason of the maxim
that-he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
The cases arising from the defective execution of
powers forms an interesting group, for the correction of which
equity will take jurisdiction. But as these cases come up
again in Mistake, the discussion of them will be reserved for
that time. Suffice it here to remark that whatever is then
said concerning Mistake, applies equally well in cases of
Amcident.
The above groups are the only attempts at classifi-
cation of these cases which may be practicable. There are
still many miscellaneous instances, some of which it will be
interesting to examine.
Thus, where a person in a fiduciary relation has
paid debts, distributive shares, and part of the legacies,
relying upon the sufficiency of the estate, which is subse-
quently rendered insufficient, through no fault of his own,
by theft, destruction, or other unusual occurrence, equity
will relieve him from liability.
In Pooley v. Ray, Adm. (IP. Wm. 355) a mortgage
was paid by Ray in obedience to a decree of court; it was
afterwards discovered that about one half the sum had been
paid. The legatee filed a bill to recover the part paid
twice, and equity granted his prayer.
Chancellor Oowper, in Edwards v. Freeman (2 P. Win.
447) says, that if an executor has paid a legacy on the sup-
position that the estate is sufficient, and it appears later
there were not enough assets, the executor may recover the
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legacy paid. In Clough v. Bond administration was granted to
a wife and her brother; the proceeds were jointly deposited tn
a bank; the brother drew out the money and absconded. Equity
went so far as to hold the estate of the administratrix's
husband liable for the loss arising from the accident.
Equity has interfered to prevent the execution of a
judgment obtained when,by accidentthe defense could not be
set up. Thus, where a person found money 'n a railroad train
and delivered it to the company to be turned over to the los-
er. Upon failure to do this the finder sued the company and
received a verdict. Before the execution the loser claimed
the money and the company was allowed in equity to defeat the
execution upon the ground that it was an accident that this
defendant did not know of the loser's claim at the time of
trial. (N. Y. & H. R. R. R. v. Haws, 56 N. Y. 175)
Also, when the plaintiff in an attachment receives
a judgment at law, by concealing the validity of the claim,
equity will interpose to protect the defendant against the
judgment, because he was unable to set up the defense of in-
validity. The concealment did not amount to a fraud. (Her-.
bert v. Herbert, 49 N. J. Eq. 70)
When the bill in equity shows that evidence of which
the defendant and his attorney were entirely ignorant and
which would have materially reduced the judgment, had been
discovered after judgment rendered, equity will stay the exe-
cution and adjust the rights of the parties. (Cairo & Fulton
R. R. v. Titus, 27 N. J. Eq. 102)
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There are a few cases of forfeitures which do not
properly come under the preceding discussion of that head.
When a life policy was to be forfeited after non-payment of a
premium, the subsequent insanity of the insured preventing
the payment of such premium, was sufficient in equity to pre-
vent the forfeiture. (Wheeler v. Qommer. Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
82 N. Y. 182) And in cases of forfeiture for non-payment of
rent, though the lessee had expressly waived the notice, yet
equity said that notice was necessary to make the forfeiture
valid and ignorance of this fact as a defense was such an ac-
cident as to defeat the forfeiture. (Palmer v. Ford, 70 Ill.
369).
Many specific instances might yet be given in which
equity has exercised jurisdiction on grounds of accident, but
perhaps it will be more profitable to formulate a general
rule or test, as nearly correct as the nature of such a rule
will permit. Whenever a party seeking relief has a clear
right, which cannot otherwise be enforcbd in a suitable or
adequate manner; or when he would be subjected to an unjusti-
fiable loss, due to no fault or misconduct of his own; or
where he has an equity superior to the party against whom he
seeks relief; he may then invoke the assistance of equity,
whenever such circumstances arise from accident.
CHAPTER II.
MISTAKE
We pass now to the second part of this discussion,
Mistake. The courts of equity have, from an early period,
exercised its jurisdiction in this class of cases. The first
case arose in the time of Edward IV in 1 Cal. 3. In this
case it was the intention of the parties to draw a bond for
future services, but by mistake the bond read for present
services. This was the origin of the doctrine that mistake
in sealed instruments could be corrected in equity. The
grounds for the jurisdiction in such a case were two,- first,
the sanctity of seals at common law forbade the latter from
interfering; second, if the law courts did take cognizance of
the matter, it would be only to declare the instrument a
nullity for want of real consent. This would more frequently
work injustice than justice, so equity took the matter in
charge and reformed the instrument, conforming it to the real
intention of the parties.
Of the various definitions of mistake the following,
taken from Pomeroy's Eq. Juris., seems the most complete and
accurate:- "Mistake is an erroneous mental condition, concep-
tion, or conviction, induced by ignorance, misapprehension,
or misunderstanding of the truth, but without negligence, and
resulting in some act or omission done, or suffered erroneous-
ly by one, or both parties to a transaction, but without its
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erroneous character being intended or known as the time."
Mr. Story adds surprise, imposition or misplaced confidence,
as three other circumstances which produce mistake. This ob-
viously is not correct, since imposition and misplaced confi-
dence more properly belong to fraud, and relief should be
sought on that ground. It is only when no element of fraud,
either actual or constructive, exists, that relief may be ob-
tained purely on the basis of mistake. The most natural
division of this subject, and the one to be followed here, is
mistakes of law and mistakes of fact.
A great deal of difficulty and obscurity surrounds
the application of that familiar maxim of law laid down in
Manser's Case (2 Coke 3), "Ignorentia legis neminem excusat",
to courts of equity.Though it is almost literally enforced at
law it loses its rigor to some extent when applied to equity.
In consequence of this relaxation two classes of exceptions
have become well established,- first, a party is not bound to
know of a private statute, or, second, the law of a foreign
state or nation. (Hasen v. Foster, 9 Pick. III; Morgan v.
Bell, 3 Wash. 556)
From this same laxity of construction the general
rule prevails, both in England and America, that equity will
allow a relief from a mere mistake of law, when it is within
the discretion of the court, and then to be exercised only in
the most unquestionable and flagrant cases. (Snell v. In.
Co., 98 U. S. 90; Story, I Eq. Juris. Sec. 138; Porneroy, Vol.
II, Sees. 843 - 847; Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U. S. 284)
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The United States Supreme Court has by well consi-
dered adjudications clearly set forth this distinction in ap-
plying the above maxim to suits in equity. In Hunt v. Rous-
manier Admin. C 8 Wheat.174 ) a creditor took a power of at-
torney for the sale of a ship under advice of counsel that
that would secure him as well as a mortgage. The debtor
shortly .afterward died and the power of attorney was revoked
by the death. Hunt then sought the equity court to have the
instrument reformed. Relief was refused on the ground that
the nature of the two instruments was a matter of general law.
In the second case, Griswold V. Hazard (141 U. S.
284) one Durant was arrested in New Port on a ne exeat.
Griswold, who was but slightly acquainted with Durat, was
asked by his nephew, a great friend of Durant, to give bail.
Griswold went to the jail Saturday night for the purpose of
giving bail to keep Durant out of jail on Sunday, and on the
understanding that the latter would remain within the juris-
diction of the court. The instrument was drawn up by Hazard's
attorney and read "to abide and perform the decrees of the
court." There was no mistake in drawing the bond, but Gris-
woldupon reading it, believed that "perform" meant to answer
for the appearance of Durant and according to the evidence
both parties were mutually mistaken as to the legal import of
the words used. The court held that it would be very ineq-
uitable to hold Griswold as surety for any decrees which
might be rendered against Durant, when his real intention was
to answer only for his appearance in court, and he was excused
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from his bond.
At first sight these two cases seem to be in direct
conflict, but upon a closer study it will be seen that sever-
al plausible theories may, and have been, advanced, seeking
to reconcile the two decisions, and not without success.
Perhaps the easiest of these explanations is, that in the maN-
im, "Ignorentia puris neminem haut excusat" the word "juris"
means a public law as distinguished from a private right,
to which the maxim is claimed to have no reference. This was
advanced by Lord Westbury in Cooper v. Phillips, (L. R. 2
H. L. 149 - 170) and again by Lord Chancellor King in the
famous case of Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, ( Mosley, 364 ) The
facts of the latter case, briefly stated, are,- the plaintiff
was the eldest son of the intestate; he had a dispute
with the younger brother of the intestate, his uncle, as to
who should have the property. They referred the matter to
one Hughes, a school-master, who consulted a book called
"Clerks' Remembrancer" and advised that the property would
never ascend, and farther stated that the property belonged
to the younger brother. They therefore agreed to share the
land. When the plaintiff discovered the mistake the court'
allowed him to cancel the agreements and take possession of
the whole.
This distinction, notwithstanding~authonity from
which it emanates., cannot justly be sustained. Is not a
party made to suffer just as great an inequity in the case of
a general law, when relief is refused, as he would in case of
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a private right or statute? Why cannot the circumstances
which prevent a recovery or remedial equity in case of a pub-
lic law be applied with equal force and justice in case of a
private right? There seems to be no apparent or inherent
difference between the two classes of law to warrant the dis-
tinction.
The theory advanced by the American jurists, Mr.
Bigelow (1 L. Q. Rev. 298) and Mr. Pomeroy, is that in the
first case the party plaintiff had the choice of two distinct
classes of securities, and he chose, though under mistake, as
to the legal import of the security, the one less apt to se-
cure him, and having done so the courts justly refuse to
create a new instrument, or contract, between the parties.
But in the later case the party had no choice; he was not
mistaken as to the legal import of the instrument he intended
to execute, namely, a bail bond; but he was mistaken as to
the legal import of the terms used. In this case to reform
the bond was not to create a new contract for the parties,
but to carry out the contract the parties really intended to
make. This certainly is easily deduced for a comparative
study of the cases and is in harmony with the policy and prac-
tice of courts of equity. That is, that equity will enforce
the intent as gathered from the evidence, but will never
create new obligations between the parties. There is yet
another dis tinct ion which may be drawn, and the one which
seems to be the true criterion to determine equitable juris-
diction in questions of this character. It may be thus stat-
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ed,- Equity will not interfere to grant relief in case of mis-
take of law, pure and simple, but it will very readily seize
upon any additional circumstances, or equities, for the pur-
pose of acquiring jurisidiction and granting the proper re-
lief.
Mr. P~meroy (Sec. 849) ventures to give the follow-
ing as a criterion to determine when equity will interfere in
cases of private right. "Whenever a person is ignorant or
mistaken with respect to his own antecedent or existing pri-
vate rights, interests, estates, duties, liabitities, or oth-
er relations, either of property or of contract, or of per-
sonal status, and enters into some transaction, the legal
scope and operation of which he wrongly comprehends and under-
stands, for the purpose of such assumed rights, interest,
etc., or for carrying out such assumed duties, or liabili-
ties, equity will grant its relief, defensive or affirmative,
treating the mistake as analogous to, if not identical with,
a mistake of fact." The writer refrains from further comment
than to say that this rdle is supported by a long line of
eminent decisions and accords with the more general rule just
previously stated.
It is well to consider here some of the specific
instances in which relief has been sought in equity,for the
purpose of learning what amounts to a mistake of law, and in
what general class of cases equity will. or will not, inter-
fere. In Webb v. Alexandria (33 Grat.168) the defendant, a
city in Virginia, issued bonds in lieu of others which had
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been sold by order of the court under the confiscation act.
The United States court held such bonds invalid. The city
then sought to restrain Webb from transfering some of the
bonds in his possession, and to have the same cancelled. The
court granted the relief upon the ground of surprise and that
the city ought not to be held to know what the court would
decide in so novel a case. The New York courts refuse to
grant relief upon grounds of surprise, saying that to do so
would open the gates to a ceaseless flow of litigation. (Jac-
obs v. Morange, 47 N. Y. 57)And generally the cases are few
where relief has been granted for surprise. As this Virginia
case indicates, the courts will sometimes grant relief when
the law is very doubtful or undecided. This was first recog-
nized by Lord Chelmsford in the noted case of Beaucamp v.
Winn, (L. R. 6 H. L. 223 - 224) when he said that though the
court has established a rule for the construction of a deed,
yet ignorance of what that construction would be ought not to
deprive the party of relief for his mistake.
When parties are in doubt as to what their legal
rights are, and with a rivw of peaceably adjusting the same,
enter into a compromise, neither party will be heardto com-
plain upon discovering that his surrendered rights were valid
and capable of enforcement. And so in family arrangements,
equity will not interfere, even though made upon grounds
which would justify interference in case of strangers. (West-
by v. Westby, 2 D. & W. 503; Shartel's Appeal, 64 Pa. 25)
The courts even go so far as to say that the parties
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need have no right at all, if they only honestly believe that
either has, and being in doubt, enter into a compromise.
Both the English and American doctrines are illustrated by
the leading case of Rullen v. Ready (2 Atk. 587). There sev-
eral children, bel±kving that all were equally entitled to
property left by will, divided the same. But one of the sons
had married and this was made a ground of forfeiture by the
will. The fact of the marriage was known, but the legal con-
sequence was not. The court refused to set aside the arrange-
ment.
It is too well settled that money paid under mis-
take of law cannot be recovered, to need any farther discussion
here.
We pass now to a consideration of the second divi-
sion of this head,- mistake of fact. A mistake of fact is a
mistake not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part
of the party making the same, and consisting in an uncon-
sciousness, ignorance, or forgetfullness of a fact, past or
present, material to the transaction, or in the belief in the
present existence of a thing material, or in the past ekist-
ence of a thing not now existing. (Kerr - Fraud and Mistake,
Sec. 406)
The exercise of jurisdiction of equity in cases of
mistake of fact is the reverse of that in cases of mistake
of law, for in the former case it is the exception for the
court to withhold its jurisdiction. So that it would nec-
essitate a complete digest to give all the instances in which
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the aid of equity may be had. It will be better to consider
the cases from a negative standpoint, considering only those
in which no relief will be granted, always keeping in mind
the test laid down in the Illinois cases, to the effect that
the jurisdiction depends upon the adequacy of the remedy at
law?4.
In Foster v. Clark, (79 Ill. 225) the master in
chancery, by mistake, omitted a parcel of land in the deed
given under a mortgage foreclosure. The correction of this
mistake was purely equitable. But in Croft v. Dickens, (78
Ill. 131) the court refused to correct a mistake in an at-
tachment bond, because the party would have by motion amended
the bond at common law, and having failed to avail himself of
the remedy at law, he cannot secure the aid of equity.
There may be two very general classes of mistake
made, of this nature, one as to the subject matter, the other
as to the terms of the contract. In the first instance the
parties have fully expressed their intentions, but are mis-
taken as to the existence, size, shape, amount, price, or
identity of the subject matter. In the second case they have
agreed to terms concerning a proper subject matter, but by
fault in reducing the terms to writing a mistake occurs as to
the addition, omission, or misunderstanding of the terms used.
In one case the intention in founded upon error - in the oth-
or the intention is erroneously expressed. The proper remedy
would be recission in the first, and reformation in the se-
cond, case.
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But to be entitled to relief it must be shown that
the case comes under the general rule as limited by the fol-
lowing qualifications.
(I) The fact must be material, for equity- no more
than law will not trouble itself about little things. To
be material it must go to the very essence of the contract
and materially affect the rights of the parties.
(2) The party seeking relief must not be chargeable
with any negligence connected with the mistake. The New York
doctrine is that though the party is negligent he may recover
provided that he leaves the other party in as good a position
as he was before the mistake. (Maher v. Mayor,63 N. Y. 455)
(3) When one party is acquainted with the facts and in-
nocently lets the other fall into mistake, no relief can be
had unless the party was under legal obligations to disclose
the facts.
(4) When the parties have equal means of knowledge and
deal at arm's length with each other, they must abide-the
consequences of any mistakes.
(5) The mistake must be mutual. "Mutual" is qualified
to mean that if the party seeks to reform, it must be mutual;
if unilateral he may only rescind. (Lyman v. United Ins. Co.,
17 John. 373; Nevins v. Dunlap, 33 N. Y. 676)
The general ground upon which these distinctions
are based is that mistakes or ignorance of facts are proper
subjects for relief only when they constitute a material in-
gredient to the contract, or disappoint the parties' intention
21
by error, or where it is inconsistent with good faith, or
violates the obligations imposed by law upon the conscience
of the parties. But where the parties are on an equal foot-
ing, and have equal facilities for knowing all the facts, and
there is no surprise or imposition, there is not a proper
ground for the interference of equity. This latter class in-
cludes those cases where doubt and uncertainty about the sub-
ject matter exists, and extends to family arrangements and
compromises, unless one party gains an unconscionable advan-
tage over the other. Nor will equity act to relieve a party
mistaken as to his expectations, or benefits arising from the
agreement, or to his motives for entering into the same. The
New York Supreme Court has a peculiar doctrine somewhat
along this line, decided in Davis v. Kling, (74 Hun. 598 -
1894). It is, that a person may be mistaken as to an expect-
ation, or a fact expected to occur in the future, as well as
to a fact already occurred. It ts an extreme case and the
above was the only theory whereby the court could render
equity to the defendant, to which he was obviously entitled.
There is only one class of cases under this head
to which special attention need be called; namely, the defect-
ive execution of powers. The defects which are remediable
are of two kinds, first, where the donee has executed one in-
strument, from which the intent to execute the power may be
inferred, but the instrument itself is informal or inappro-
p±riate, (Tollet v. Tollet, 1 Smith's fl. C. 254); second,
where there is a defect in the execution of a formal instru-
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ment. (Chance on Powers, Sees. 2878, 9, 86, 90)
It will be seen from the above that the defects are
made formal defects and that some instrument is requisite, so
equity will not interfere in the non-execution of a power, as
in the case where a party merely expresses his intention to
execute the power without taking any farther steps to indi-
cate the fulfillment of his intention.
The citation under the first head is the illustra-
tive case. The donee executed to one Tollet a power by will,
which should have been executed by deed, and the courts sus-
tained the execution;farther stating that the reverse would
not be aiddd in equity, for by a deed the donee would put be-
yond his power to control the subject matter of the power,
and would be unable to properly execute the same.
Instances of the second class are very numerous,
arising from the omission of a seal, or a signature, or a too
small number of witnesses. The anomalous character of this
class of mistakes consists in the definiteness of the speci-
fic cases in which equity will interfere to aid certain per-
sons. It will exercise jurisdiction in favor of a bona fide
purchaser, including mortgagor and lessee, of creditors, of a
wife, of a legitimate child, and of a charity. On the other
hand, relief has been denied when the execution was in favor
of the donee himself, of a husband, illegitimate child, bro-
ther or sister, or any remote relative, or mere volunteer or
stranger. In short, jurisdiction will be entertained only in
the five cases given above. (See cases in Shell's Eq., p 362)
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The single exception is in favor of a volunteer,
when by accident the formal execution was rendered impossi-
ble. (Fonb. Eq. 338, note (h))
The general rule may be stated that if the party
seeking relief has a greater equity, and the defect is not of
the essence of the power, and the execution thereof will not
defeat the real intent of the donee, equity will lend its aid
to a meritorious party.
Equity has always been very free to relieve against
mistakes in wills, when they are apparent on the face of the
instrument, or may be shown by the proper construction. But
the evidence in such cases must be very clear And unequivocal.
The rule was but recently laid down in -the New York Supreme
Court, that equity will not relieve against a mistake of
fact unless it is made to appear by a greater preponderance
of evidence than is required in other civil actions* Manhat-
tan Elevated R. R. v. Johnson, 84 Hun. 183- 1895)
In closing, the writer would say that he has attempt-
ed to set forth clearly and £ofrcibly the general doctrines
and rules governing the subjects under consideration. While
he regrets that the time and space would not allow a fuller
discussion of this interesting branch of equity jurisprudence,
yet he will feel well repaid if the reader is to any extent
enabled to free himself of any doubts relative to these sub-
jects by the perusab of this article.
